Technology & Software Engineering Top 100 / #63ARD = Agentic Resource Discovery · A2A = Agent2Agent · MCP = Model Context Protocol

Coding agent · Apache-2.0 · GitHub; terminal

Aider

Long-running, trusted terminal pair-programming agent with extensive model support. Publisher: Aider AI. Also ranked in Cybersecurity (#86), Supply Chain, Manufacturing & Logistics (#89), Sales, Marketing & Customer Experience (#91).

Vendor page ↗+ CompareExport JSON

Trust profileas of 2026-10-26

Publisherlikely · Repository ownership or inferred publisher domain — repository or Hub account ownershiplikely

Complianceno evidence foundT5

Security9 CVEs linked in the registry · 2 critical/high · newest 2026-10-23linked

ProtocolsModel Context Protocol (MCP) probed, not foundAgent2Agent (A2A) probed, not foundAgentic Resource Discovery (ARD) probed, not found0 / 3

TracesNone found — nobody has published what this agent does under attacknone

Issues found0 regulator actions · 0 incidents · 0 withdrawn certificates · CVEs: see Securitylinks only

Evidence available — not a safety certification. Suitability depends on your task, deployment and permissions. Rows marked vendor-level describe Aider AI, not this agent specifically.

Traces — under attack, in defence, in incidents

none public · what a trace is

No public trace found. Nobody has published what Aider does when its inputs carry instructions it should not follow, when a tool asks for credentials, or when a task invites a destructive command. Defenders can't learn from what they can't see: run it in a sandbox before the pilot and keep the transcript, or ask the vendor to publish one.

● third-party or vendor report · ◎ this registry's own probe transcript · ⚠ data left the environment. A trace describes one version on one date; it is evidence of behaviour, never a certification. Rows marked unreviewed have not yet been checked against their source by the maintainer.

CVEs — on the official record

9 linked · the registry

CVE-2026-115726

2026-10-23

Aider through 0.86.2 contains a command execution vulnerability that allows attackers to run shell commands by committing a malicious .aider.conf.yml that is auto-loaded without a…

Code execution · unreviewed

High 8.5

CVE-2026-85674

2026-09-04

aider (aider-chat) automatically loads a .aider.conf.yml configuration file from the root of the git repository it is launched in. A crafted repository can set test-cmd (executed…

Code execution · Credential access · unreviewed

High 8.5

CVE-2026-10174

2026-05-31

A vulnerability was identified in Aider-AI Aider 0.86.3. Affected is an unknown function of the file aider/args.py of the component Pre-commit Hook Handler. Such manipulation of t…

— · unreviewed

Low 2.1

CVE-2026-10175

2026-05-31

A security flaw has been discovered in Aider-AI Aider 0.86.3. Affected by this vulnerability is the function editor_coder.run of the file auth.py of the component Architect Mode.…

Code execution · unreviewed

Low 2.1

CVE-2026-10176

2026-05-31

A weakness has been identified in Aider-AI Aider 0.86.3. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component Code Generation Workflow. Executing a manipulation c…

— · unreviewed

Low 2.1

CVE-2026-10177

2026-05-31

A security vulnerability has been detected in Aider-AI Aider 0.86.3. This affects the function requests.get of the file api_docs.py of the component AWS EC2 Metadata Endpoint. The…

SSRF · unreviewed

Low 2.1

CVE-2026-7316

2026-04-28

A vulnerability has been found in eiliyaabedini aider-mcp up to 667b914301aada695aab0e46d1fb3a7d5e32c8af. Affected is an unknown function of the file aider_mcp.py of the component…

Code execution · unreviewed

Medium 5.5

CVE-2026-7157

2026-04-27

A flaw has been found in disler aider-mcp-server up to b2516fa466d0d851932da92ee6d0e66946db9efc. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file src/aider_m…

Code execution · unreviewed

Medium 5.5

1 more · All 9 in the registry → Severity is the official record's; nothing here enters the score. Links are by listed product, so a CVE that names a different component of the same platform may be missing.

Compliance evidence

4 frameworks shown

–

SOC 2

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

ISO 27001

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

ISO 42001

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

CSA STAR

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · CSA STAR Registry

ask the vendor

"Unknown" means nothing was found in the sources checked — registries, marketplaces and the vendor's own pages. It is not a finding of non-compliance; ask the vendor.

✔ found · ○ claimed · – not found · ⚠ expired, stale or revoked. Every row links to its source.Dispute or correct this dossier

GDPR, assembled from checks

GDPR● 0 found in registries or documents○ 0 vendor-claimed⚠ 0 issues linkedas of 2026-10-26

– Not foundNo Article 42 GDPR seal. "GDPR certified" is never shown without one.

☐ You checkYour lawful basis, DPIA, and whether this agent is inside the certificate scope.

News and chatter

last 90 days · linked with confidence ≥ 0.85

Nothing linked from Hacker News, GDELT, GitHub releases or the vendor's feed in the last 90 days.

Headline, link and a summary attributed to the outlet. News never changes trust or domain scores.

Technology & Software Engineering score

technology profile · sar-score-2.0 · #63 of 100 in the curated list

Adoption / usage26 / 30

Trust & security16 / 25

Project / product health20 / 20

Ecosystem / interoperability13 / 15

Domain expertise / fit35 / 100

Governance / compliance evidenceunknown

Docs / transparency10 / 10

Raw component / maximum, then weighted by the technology profile (adoption 30, trust 20, project 20, ecosystem 15, domain 10, governance 0, docs 5). Trust and governance are computed from the evidence on this page (vendor-level rows at half credit); the other components come from the curated workbook, whose order is the rank. Unknown components count as 0 and are never imputed.

Before you deploy

Deployment questions answered from the vendor's documentation, each with its source.

✔Reads private repositories? Yes — "AI pair programming in your terminal" in your local git repo source

✔Executes code or writes changes? Yes — "Aider will git commit all of its changes, so they are easy to track and undo" source

◐Credential handling documented? Configurable — Model API keys are passed on the command line (--api-key) or from the environment; nothing else is documented on the page checked source

✔Can run entirely on your own machine or infrastructure? Yes — Local terminal tool; model calls go to the provider you configure source

✕Human approval before consequential actions? No — Edits are applied and committed, then shown as diffs; review happens after the fact with /undo. No pre-edit approval step is documented source

Evidence supporting this use (4)

Reads private repositories: yes — "AI pair programming in your terminal" in your local git repo source

Executes code or writes changes: yes — "Aider will git commit all of its changes, so they are easy to track and undo" source

Credential handling documented: configurable — Model API keys are passed on the command line (--api-key) or from the environment; nothing else is documented on the page checked source

Can run entirely on your own machine or infrastructure: yes — Local terminal tool; model calls go to the provider you configure source

Unknowns to check (4)

Human approval before consequential actions: no — Edits are applied and committed, then shown as diffs; review happens after the fact with /undo. No pre-edit approval step is documented source

Your lawful basis and DPIA for PHI and personal data the agent will touch

Ask the vendor for SOC 2, ISO 27001, ISO 42001, CSA STAR evidence; none was found in the sources checked

Whether the agent exposes MCP or A2A endpoints; none were observed

Suggested restrictions for a pilot (4)

Keep a human approval gate outside the agent — pull-request review or action confirmation — for every write and command during the pilot.

Limit the pilot to one non-production repository with a protected default branch; let the agent push to one branch only.

Ask for the SOC 2 report under NDA before the pilot touches customer data; none was found in the sources checked.

No public trace of this agent under adversarial input was found. Run it in a sandbox against your own prompt-injection and tool-abuse scenarios before the pilot, and keep the transcript; the enterprise edition records one.

See the worked comparison: Three ways to let a coding agent into a private repository →

Rules: config/deploy_rules.json. Advice for a bounded pilot, not a verdict.

Provenance

seed workbookscores, rank, category

Hacker News, GDELT, vendor feedsnews and chatter

First seen2026-10-26

Recordres_94bad96f7316f09e

Open the full record (JSON) →