Technology & Software Engineering Top 100 / #54ARD = Agentic Resource Discovery · A2A = Agent2Agent · MCP = Model Context Protocol

Coding agent · MIT · GitHub; cloud/self-hosted

OpenHands

Major open-source autonomous software-development agent platform. Publisher: All Hands AI. Also ranked in Supply Chain, Manufacturing & Logistics (#82), Sales, Marketing & Customer Experience (#83), Business & Enterprise Operations (#84).

Vendor page ↗+ CompareExport JSON

Trust profileas of 2026-10-26

Publisherlikely · Repository ownership or inferred publisher domain — repository or Hub account ownershiplikely

Complianceno evidence foundT5

Security2 CVEs linked in the registry · 1 critical/high · newest 2026-08-06linked

ProtocolsModel Context Protocol (MCP) probed, not foundAgent2Agent (A2A) probed, not foundAgentic Resource Discovery (ARD) probed, not found0 / 3

TracesNone found — nobody has published what this agent does under attacknone

Issues found0 regulator actions · 0 incidents · 0 withdrawn certificates · CVEs: see Securitylinks only

Evidence available — not a safety certification. Suitability depends on your task, deployment and permissions. Rows marked vendor-level describe All Hands AI, not this agent specifically.

Traces — under attack, in defence, in incidents

none public · what a trace is

No public trace found. Nobody has published what OpenHands does when its inputs carry instructions it should not follow, when a tool asks for credentials, or when a task invites a destructive command. Defenders can't learn from what they can't see: run it in a sandbox before the pilot and keep the transcript, or ask the vendor to publish one.

● third-party or vendor report · ◎ this registry's own probe transcript · ⚠ data left the environment. A trace describes one version on one date; it is evidence of behaviour, never a certification. Rows marked unreviewed have not yet been checked against their source by the maintainer.

CVEs — on the official record

2 linked · the registry

CVE-2026-19022

2026-08-06

A vulnerability was determined in OpenHands up to 0.62.0. The affected element is the function initialize_repo of the file OpenHands/resolver/send_pull_request.py. This manipulati…

Code execution · unreviewed

Medium 5.3

CVE-2026-33718

2026-03-27

OpenHands is software for AI-driven development. Starting in version 1.5.0, a Command Injection vulnerability exists in the `get_git_diff()` method at `openhands/runtime/utils/git…

Code execution · fix known · unreviewed

Critical 9.9

All 2 in the registry → Severity is the official record's; nothing here enters the score. Links are by listed product, so a CVE that names a different component of the same platform may be missing.

Compliance evidence

4 frameworks shown

–

SOC 2

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

ISO 27001

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

ISO 42001

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages

ask the vendor

–

CSA STAR

T5 Unknown

Nothing found in the sources checked.

Scope: — · CSA STAR Registry

ask the vendor

"Unknown" means nothing was found in the sources checked — registries, marketplaces and the vendor's own pages. It is not a finding of non-compliance; ask the vendor.

✔ found · ○ claimed · – not found · ⚠ expired, stale or revoked. Every row links to its source.Dispute or correct this dossier

GDPR, assembled from checks

GDPR● 0 found in registries or documents○ 0 vendor-claimed⚠ 0 issues linkedas of 2026-10-26

– Not foundNo Article 42 GDPR seal. "GDPR certified" is never shown without one.

☐ You checkYour lawful basis, DPIA, and whether this agent is inside the certificate scope.

News and chatter

last 90 days · linked with confidence ≥ 0.85

2026-10-23

OpenHands release v1.33.0

GitHub releases · ## 1.33.0 (2026-10-23)  ## What's Changed ### Features * feat(verify-openhands): launch --mars-web and --lock-to-cloud by @enyst in https://github.com/Open

Product update

2026-10-23

OpenHands release v1.32.0

GitHub releases · ## 1.32.0 (2026-10-23)  ## What's Changed ### Features * feat(home): store pinned automations in agent-server settings by @abhayymishraa in https://github.

Product update

Headline, link and a summary attributed to the outlet. News never changes trust or domain scores.

Technology & Software Engineering score

technology profile · sar-score-2.0 · #54 of 100 in the curated list

Adoption / usage27 / 30

Trust & security16 / 25

Project / product health20 / 20

Ecosystem / interoperability14 / 15

Domain expertise / fit72 / 100

Governance / compliance evidenceunknown

Docs / transparency9 / 10

Raw component / maximum, then weighted by the technology profile (adoption 30, trust 20, project 20, ecosystem 15, domain 10, governance 0, docs 5). Trust and governance are computed from the evidence on this page (vendor-level rows at half credit); the other components come from the curated workbook, whose order is the rank. Unknown components count as 0 and are never imputed.

Before you deploy

Deployment questions answered from the vendor's documentation, each with its source.

✔Reads private repositories? Yes — The agent server works on a workspace in a Process, Docker or Remote sandbox source

✔Executes code or writes changes? Yes — Docker sandbox: "Good isolation from your host machine"; Process sandbox: "No container isolation" source

?Credential handling documented? Not documented — Not covered on the pages checked source

✔Can run entirely on your own machine or infrastructure? Yes — Process and Docker sandboxes run on your machine; Remote "used by managed deployments and some hosted setups" source

◐Human approval before consequential actions? Configurable — "Confirmation policy controls whether actions require user approval before execution"; ConfirmRisky needs a security analyzer; no default policy stated source

Evidence supporting this use (4)

Reads private repositories: yes — The agent server works on a workspace in a Process, Docker or Remote sandbox source

Executes code or writes changes: yes — Docker sandbox: "Good isolation from your host machine"; Process sandbox: "No container isolation" source

Can run entirely on your own machine or infrastructure: yes — Process and Docker sandboxes run on your machine; Remote "used by managed deployments and some hosted setups" source

Human approval before consequential actions: configurable — "Confirmation policy controls whether actions require user approval before execution"; ConfirmRisky needs a security analyzer; no default policy stated source

Unknowns to check (4)

Credential handling documented: not documented — Not covered on the pages checked. Ask the vendor. source

Your lawful basis and DPIA for PHI and personal data the agent will touch

Ask the vendor for SOC 2, ISO 27001, ISO 42001, CSA STAR evidence; none was found in the sources checked

Whether the agent exposes MCP or A2A endpoints; none were observed

Suggested restrictions for a pilot (4)

Pilot with scoped, short-lived tokens only; keep production secrets out of the agent's environment.

Limit the pilot to one non-production repository with a protected default branch; let the agent push to one branch only.

Ask for the SOC 2 report under NDA before the pilot touches customer data; none was found in the sources checked.

No public trace of this agent under adversarial input was found. Run it in a sandbox against your own prompt-injection and tool-abuse scenarios before the pilot, and keep the transcript; the enterprise edition records one.

See the worked comparison: Three ways to let a coding agent into a private repository →

Rules: config/deploy_rules.json. Advice for a bounded pilot, not a verdict.

Provenance

seed workbookscores, rank, category

NVDsecurity (CVE keyword search)

Hacker News, GDELT, vendor feedsnews and chatter

First seen2026-10-26

Recordres_41537a4331208885

Open the full record (JSON) →