Reference implementation Data compiled from public sources as of 2026-10-26. Not an assessment, certification or recommendation. Confirm current status with the vendor and the issuing body.
AgentDossier · AI Agent Registry Find agents you can actually trust - public or inside your enterprise.
Data & Analytics Top 100 / #–ARD = Agentic Resource Discovery · A2A = Agent2Agent · MCP = Model Context Protocol
Open-source project · Apache-2.0 · self-hosted

tidb

TiDB is built for agentic workloads that grow unpredictably, with ACID guarantees and native support for transactions, analytics, and vector search. No data silos. No noisy neighbors. No infrastructure ceiling. Publisher: pingcap.

Vendor page ↗+ CompareExport JSON
Trust profileas of 2026-10-26
Publisherlikely · Repository ownership or inferred publisher domain — repository or Hub account ownershiplikely
Complianceno evidence about this agent · 3 vendor-level records (inherited)T5
SecurityNo CVE linked to this agent in the CVE registry — none linked in the products checked, not a findingnone
ProtocolsModel Context Protocol (MCP) probed, not foundAgent2Agent (A2A) probed, not foundAgentic Resource Discovery (ARD) probed, not found0 / 3
TracesNone found — nobody has published what this agent does under attacknone
Issues found0 regulator actions · 0 incidents · 0 withdrawn certificates · CVEs: see Securitylinks only

Publisher unconfirmed: the evidence below is shown but not counted in the governance score, because nothing yet ties this listing to pingcap beyond repository or Hub account ownership. A vendor-domain page, marketplace listing, ARD manifest or A2A card would confirm it.

Evidence available — not a safety certification. Suitability depends on your task, deployment and permissions. Rows marked vendor-level describe pingcap, not this agent specifically.

Traces — under attack, in defence, in incidents

none public · what a trace is

No public trace found. Nobody has published what tidb does when its inputs carry instructions it should not follow, when a tool asks for credentials, or when a task invites a destructive command. Defenders can't learn from what they can't see: run it in a sandbox before the pilot and keep the transcript, or ask the vendor to publish one.

● third-party or vendor report · ◎ this registry's own probe transcript · ⚠ data left the environment. A trace describes one version on one date; it is evidence of behaviour, never a certification. Rows marked unreviewed have not yet been checked against their source by the maintainer.

CVEs — on the official record

none linked · the registry

No CVE in the registry names this agent or its listed product. That reads "none linked in the products checked", never as a finding: a product that is not on the registry's list, or a record that names it differently, is not seen. The vendor's own advisories remain the source of truth.

Compliance evidence

Jurisdiction: EU · 7 frameworks shown
–
ISO 27001
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages
ask the vendor
–
ISO 27701
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages
ask the vendor
–
ISO 42001
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages
ask the vendor
–
CSA STAR
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · CSA STAR Registry
ask the vendor

"Unknown" means nothing was found in the sources checked — registries, marketplaces and the vendor's own pages. It is not a finding of non-compliance; ask the vendor.

About the vendor — inherited, not agent-specific

3 records matched at organisation level
○
GDPR · DPF active
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
PCI DSS
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
SOC 2
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02

A vendor-level registry entry proves the organisation was assessed; whether this agent is inside that scope is a question for the vendor. These rows do not count toward the agent's evidence tier.

✔ found · ○ claimed · – not found · ⚠ expired, stale or revoked. Every row links to its source.Dispute or correct this dossier

GDPR, assembled from checks

GDPR● 0 found in registries or documents○ 1 vendor-claimed⚠ 0 issues linkedas of 2026-10-26
○ ClaimedDPF active: Vendor-claimed (vendor page, 2026-10-26). Proves a transfer mechanism for EU-to-US transfers only.
– Not foundNo Article 42 GDPR seal. "GDPR certified" is never shown without one.
☐ You checkYour lawful basis, DPIA, and whether this agent is inside the certificate scope.

News and chatter

last 90 days · linked with confidence ≥ 0.85
2026-10-16
TiDB Cloud BYOC Public Preview: Fully Managed Distributed SQL in Your AWS Account
tidb.io (vendor) · Teams running distributed SQL in production face a trade-off. A managed service removes the work of upgrades, scaling, and backups, and it moves the database into the vendor’s cloud account. Self-managing TiDB keeps the database in your ac
Review
2026-10-15
Different Starting Points, One Data Foundation: What’s New in TiDB Cloud
tidb.io (vendor) · Nobody approves a project called “add complexity.” It builds up one shard, one region, and one compliance requirement at a time, until a single database has turned into a fleet and the team running it has grown to match. Atlassian reached
News

Headline, link and a summary attributed to the outlet. News never changes trust or domain scores.

Data & Analytics score

76
data profile · sar-score-2.0 · unranked
Adoption / usage27 / 30
Trust & security16 / 25
Project / product health20 / 20
Ecosystem / interoperability3 / 15
Domain expertise / fit95 / 100
Governance / compliance evidence0 / 100
Docs / transparency7 / 10

Raw component / maximum, then weighted by the data profile (adoption 25, trust 20, project 20, ecosystem 15, domain 15, governance 0, docs 5). Trust and governance are computed from the evidence on this page (vendor-level rows at half credit); the other components come from the curated workbook, whose order is the rank. Unknown components count as 0 and are never imputed.

Before you deploy

Derived from the evidence ledger. This agent is not yet in the reference set, so deployment questions (credentials, approval, data handling) are not answered here — ask the vendor.

Evidence supporting this use (3)
GDPR DPF active — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
PCI DSS — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
SOC 2 — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
Unknowns to check (5)
Your lawful basis and DPIA for the personal data the agent will process
That the SOC 2 report period covers the components you will use; request the report under NDA
The transfer mechanism you will rely on; DPF covers EU-to-US transfers only
Ask the vendor for ISO 27001, ISO 27701, ISO 42001, CSA STAR evidence; none was found in the sources checked
Whether the agent exposes MCP or A2A endpoints; none were observed
Suggested restrictions for a pilot (1)
No public trace of this agent under adversarial input was found. Run it in a sandbox against your own prompt-injection and tool-abuse scenarios before the pilot, and keep the transcript; the enterprise edition records one.

Rules: config/deploy_rules.json. Advice for a bounded pilot, not a verdict.

Provenance

GitHubrepository signals, license
vendor pageclaims
Hacker News, GDELT, vendor feedsnews and chatter
First seen2026-10-26
Recordres_e024d25dfcb97155
Open the full record (JSON) →