Reference implementation Data compiled from public sources as of 2026-10-26. Not an assessment, certification or recommendation. Confirm current status with the vendor and the issuing body.
AgentDossier · AI Agent Registry Find agents you can actually trust - public or inside your enterprise.
Technology & Software Engineering Top 100 / #–ARD = Agentic Resource Discovery · A2A = Agent2Agent · MCP = Model Context Protocol
Open-source project · Apache-2.0 · self-hosted

xerj

Local-first search engine and MCP server for AI agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora. Publisher: xerj-org.

Vendor page ↗+ CompareExport JSON
Trust profileas of 2026-10-26
Publisherconfirmed · Vendor-domain page, marketplace listing or metadata at publisher domain — product page served from the vendor's own domainconfirmed
Complianceno evidence about this agent · 7 vendor-level records (inherited)T5
SecurityNo CVE linked to this agent in the CVE registry — none linked in the products checked, not a findingnone
ProtocolsModel Context Protocol (MCP) claimed — named in the resource's own tags; no endpoint at the publisher's well-known paths sourceAgent2Agent (A2A) probed, not foundAgentic Resource Discovery (ARD) probed, not found1 / 3
TracesNone found — nobody has published what this agent does under attacknone
Issues found0 regulator actions · 0 incidents · 0 withdrawn certificates · CVEs: see Securitylinks only

Evidence available — not a safety certification. Suitability depends on your task, deployment and permissions. Rows marked vendor-level describe xerj-org, not this agent specifically.

Traces — under attack, in defence, in incidents

none public · what a trace is

No public trace found. Nobody has published what xerj does when its inputs carry instructions it should not follow, when a tool asks for credentials, or when a task invites a destructive command. Defenders can't learn from what they can't see: run it in a sandbox before the pilot and keep the transcript, or ask the vendor to publish one.

● third-party or vendor report · ◎ this registry's own probe transcript · ⚠ data left the environment. A trace describes one version on one date; it is evidence of behaviour, never a certification. Rows marked unreviewed have not yet been checked against their source by the maintainer.

CVEs — on the official record

none linked · the registry

No CVE in the registry names this agent or its listed product. That reads "none linked in the products checked", never as a finding: a product that is not on the registry's list, or a record that names it differently, is not seen. The vendor's own advisories remain the source of truth.

Compliance evidence

Jurisdiction: US + EU · 9 frameworks shown
–
ISO 42001
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · registries, marketplaces, vendor pages
ask the vendor
–
CSA STAR
T5 Unknown
Nothing found in the sources checked.
Scope: — · CSA STAR Registry
ask the vendor

"Unknown" means nothing was found in the sources checked — registries, marketplaces and the vendor's own pages. It is not a finding of non-compliance; ask the vendor.

About the vendor — inherited, not agent-specific

7 records matched at organisation level
○
FedRAMP
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
GDPR
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
HIPAA · BAA available
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
BAA available
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
ISO 27001 · ISO 27001
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
PCI DSS
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
SOC 2 · SOC 2 Type I
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02
○
SOC 2 · SOC 2 Type II
T4 Vendor-claimed · vendor-level
Vendor-claimed
Scope: entity · vendor page · 2026-10-26
re-check 2026-11-02

A vendor-level registry entry proves the organisation was assessed; whether this agent is inside that scope is a question for the vendor. These rows do not count toward the agent's evidence tier.

✔ found · ○ claimed · – not found · ⚠ expired, stale or revoked. Every row links to its source.Dispute or correct this dossier

GDPR, assembled from checks

GDPR● 0 found in registries or documents○ 1 vendor-claimed⚠ 0 issues linkedas of 2026-10-26
○ ClaimedVendor-claimed (vendor page, 2026-10-26).
– Not foundNo Article 42 GDPR seal. "GDPR certified" is never shown without one.
☐ You checkYour lawful basis, DPIA, and whether this agent is inside the certificate scope.

News and chatter

last 90 days · linked with confidence ≥ 0.85
2026-10-26
xerj: hub pack: rust-vulns @ b71a98bc
GitHub releases · +1 outlet · Pre-indexed, signed Corpus Hub v2 pack for the `rust-vulns` record corpus. - content pin: `b71a98bca7f0e33ab7a86becc4f37f03704b18fb` (records of 2026-10-26) - licence: CC0-1.0 (adapt-with-attribution) - definitions: 2781, files: 2 - built
Product update
2026-10-26
xerj: rust-vulns corpus pack (pack-rust-vulns-2026-10-26)
GitHub releases · The `rust-vulns` corpus pack, built and signed by the scheduled `pack publish` workflow from `tools/packs/rust-vulns/recipe.toml`. One release per build; under immutable releases a same-day rebuild publishes under `-r2`, `-r3`, … instead o
Product update

Headline, link and a summary attributed to the outlet. News never changes trust or domain scores.

Technology & Software Engineering score

79
technology profile · sar-score-2.0 · unranked
Adoption / usage24 / 30
Trust & security20 / 25
Project / product health20 / 20
Ecosystem / interoperability7 / 15
Domain expertise / fit81 / 100
Governance / compliance evidence6 / 100
Docs / transparency7 / 10

Raw component / maximum, then weighted by the technology profile (adoption 30, trust 20, project 20, ecosystem 15, domain 10, governance 0, docs 5). Trust and governance are computed from the evidence on this page (vendor-level rows at half credit); the other components come from the curated workbook, whose order is the rank. Unknown components count as 0 and are never imputed.

Before you deploy

Derived from the evidence ledger. This agent is not yet in the reference set, so deployment questions (credentials, approval, data handling) are not answered here — ask the vendor.

Evidence supporting this use (7)
FedRAMP — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
GDPR — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
HIPAA BAA available — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
ISO 27001 — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
PCI DSS — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
SOC 2 Type I — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
SOC 2 Type II — vendor-claimed, vendor-level source
Unknowns to check (6)
Your lawful basis and DPIA for PHI and personal data the agent will touch
That the SOC 2 report period covers the components you will use; request the report under NDA
That the HIPAA BAA is offered for this product tier and region
Whether the ISO 27001 certificate scope names this service, or only the platform
Current FedRAMP status with the agency, if government use is intended
The transfer mechanism you will rely on; DPF covers EU-to-US transfers only
Suggested restrictions for a pilot (1)
No public trace of this agent under adversarial input was found. Run it in a sandbox against your own prompt-injection and tool-abuse scenarios before the pilot, and keep the transcript; the enterprise edition records one.

Rules: config/deploy_rules.json. Advice for a bounded pilot, not a verdict.

Provenance

GitHubrepository signals, license
vendor pageclaims
Hacker News, GDELT, vendor feedsnews and chatter
First seen2026-10-26
Recordres_d80551ffdb6f0d49
Open the full record (JSON) →