Traces / TR-2026-008
s1ngularity: npm-borne malware drives developers' own AI CLIs (Claude, Gemini, Q) to hunt for secrets
Malicious versions of the Nx build package shipped a postinstall script that, on developer machines and in CI, invoked locally installed AI command-line agents — Claude, Gemini and Amazon Q — with permission-skipping flags (--dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo, --trust-all-tools) and prompted them to enumerate the filesystem for wallets, keystores, .env files and SSH keys. Wiz observed the AI-assisted reconnaissance succeed in hundreds of cases (provider guardrails sometimes intervened). Harvested tokens were base64-encoded into attacker-created public GitHub repos; a second wave used leaked tokens to flip victims' private repositories public. This is a trace of AI agents turned into the attacker's reconnaissance tool.
Timeline
What defenders can take from it
- A capable AI CLI on a developer's machine becomes an attack tool once code can invoke it — treat permission-skipping flags as a privilege, not a convenience.
- Provider guardrails refused some of the malicious prompts; that layer is worth keeping, but it is probabilistic, not a control.
- Secrets reachable to a shell are reachable to an agent the shell can launch; scope what a developer agent is allowed to read.
The maintainer's reading of the public reports, not advice specific to your deployment.
Sources · 2
- s1ngularity: supply chain attack leaks secrets on GitHub: everything you need to know — Wiz, 2025-08-27
- The s1ngularity attack: When attackers prompt your AI agents to do their bidding — Okta Threat Intelligence, 2025-09
Links re-checked 2026-10-26 by the weekly refresh. A link that moved or stopped answering is flagged above; it is not a change to the record.
Compiled from the public sources above, as reported. Not an attribution, a finding of fault or a legal conclusion; figures are those stated by the sources. One event, as of its sources' dates.