Reference implementation Data compiled from public sources as of 2026-10-26. Not an assessment, certification or recommendation. Confirm current status with the vendor and the issuing body.

Traces / TR-2026-011

agent was the target · researcher disclosure · unreviewed

CurXecute and MCPoison: prompt injection and config swaps turn Cursor's MCP support into code execution

Two flaws in the Cursor AI code editor's Model Context Protocol support. CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135, Aim Labs, CVSS 8.6): external content an MCP server ingests can prompt the agent to "improve" the project's .cursor/mcp.json, and Cursor ran the written config before the user accepted it — indirect prompt injection to remote code execution. MCPoison (CVE-2025-54136, Check Point, CVSS 7.2): once a user approves an MCP server entry, its command can later be swapped for a malicious one without re-prompting, giving persistent execution. Any third-party MCP server handling untrusted data (issue trackers, support tools, search engines) is a path in.

Timeline

2025-08-04 SecurityWeek reports both CVEs patched; Aim Labs names CVE-2025-54135 CurXecute, Check Point names CVE-2025-54136 MCPoison · SecurityWeek T2

What defenders can take from it

  1. A config file an agent can edit is executable surface; don't run a written MCP config before the user has approved that exact content.
  2. Approval must bind to the content, not the entry — if an approved server's command can later change silently, the approval is meaningless (MCPoison).
  3. Any MCP server that reads untrusted data extends the injection surface into the editor.

The maintainer's reading of the public reports, not advice specific to your deployment.

Sources · 2

Links re-checked 2026-10-26 by the weekly refresh. A link that moved or stopped answering is flagged above; it is not a change to the record.

Compiled from the public sources above, as reported. Not an attribution, a finding of fault or a legal conclusion; figures are those stated by the sources. One event, as of its sources' dates.